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introduction
It is both a pleasure and an honour to address you here today to celebrate my career at 
the Radboud University over the past 22 years. For me it is of course a bittersweet oc-
casion - I will miss so many of the colleagues, the students and the wonderful environ-
ment - but sweet as my successor has been named and I am delighted with the choice. 
I will divide this lecture into four parts and a conclusion - first I would like to thank the 
university for the opportunities which it has given me. Secondly, I would like to reflect 
on the importance of my students in the development of my academic work and my 
understanding of the importance of knowledge creation and dissemination. Thirdly, I 
will return to my inaugural lecture of May 2001 and examine the blueprint which I laid 
out there for my academic career - what is important now from the theoretical framing 
of state sovereignty and border control which I began to develop then. Fourthly, I will 
assess how the intervening 18 years have confirmed or confounded my expectations 
regarding the borders of Europe and their controls and why. Finally I will conclude 
looking towards the future and what may be the challenges for the forthcoming 20 
years in this field. 
the university
When I came to the Radboud University in 1997 at the invitation of Professors 
Groenendijk and Fernhout, I never anticipated that my career would be changed 
forever. I was a full-time practicing solicitor in London who had been astonished by the 
effect that EU law was having on the lives of third country nationals in the UK. The 
duty of good faith in EU law meant that British officials were required to grant residence 
cards to Turkish workers in the UK and third country national family members of EU 
nationals who had moved to the UK with only very limited conditions and minimal 
fees. In 1991 the Court of Justice had found that Turkish workers were entitled to the 
protection of the subsidiary legislation under the EC Turkey Agreement (a Dutch 
reference to the Court), in 1992 it found that British citizens returning to the UK after 
living in another EU state were entitled to be accompanied or joined by their third 
country national family members on EU terms (not the more restrictive and expensive 
national rules). The adoption of the association agreements with the Central and 
Eastern European States from 1992 onwards were providing fertile new sources of rights 
and leading towards enlargement in 2004. I first came to the Radboud University to 
investigate this transformation, as I saw it, of the nature of rights in Europe where 
individuals were entitled to rely on EU generated rights to defeat national restrictive 
rules and national officials accepted this obligation. This led to my PHD. This 
investigation led, in time, to my inaugural lecture - Moving the Borders of Europe - a 
reflection on the relationship of state sovereignty to borders and their control. I will 
return to this shortly. 
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In 2001 a CPO Wisselleerstoel was opened for European Migration Law and I was ap-
pointed. This led to the opening of a chair in European Immigration Law the following 
year where as a result of the death of Hanneke Steenbergen, a colleague and academic 
for whom I have the highest regard, I was appointed to the post. I would like to express 
a particularly thanks to those colleagues who have had such confidence in my work and 
have made my stay at the Radboud University such a pleasure. Of course Professor Kees 
Groenendijk must be the first to whom I must express my thanks. His supervision of 
my work when I was a student, and his wise counsel ever afterwards has been of great 
importance to me and to the development of my work. In the process, Kees and Fifi have 
become good friends. Roel Fernhout has been an exceptional colleague, always willing 
to provide advice and assist with my work. Over the last ten years my closest collabora-
tors have been Professor Paul Minderhoud and Dr Sandra Mantu with whom we have 
managed the European Journal of Migration and Law, an academic network for the 
European Commission on implementation of free movement of workers and three Jean 
Monnet projects of the Centre of Excellence. With Dr Anita Bocker we have written 
together a book on free movement rights and supervised a PHD student with great suc-
cess. 
Becoming a university professor is a great privilege and an honour. I am very aware of 
the confidence which the university invested in me by appointing me to the post of 
professor. Professors are nominated to lead the academic community and to create new 
knowledge which will have a positive impact of society. We are given an authority by the 
university community to speak and to have our voices heard. In politically difficult and 
sensitive fields like migration, borders and asylum in Europe, a particularly heavy duty 
is apparent. Our field is mired in inaccuracies, fears, prejudices and vulnerable to in-
strumentalisation by those who speak the language of ultra-patriotism. Our duty to 
examine carefully the field and to exercise the utmost integrity in the creation of new 
knowledge is profound. My academic position has been informed both by international 
human rights commitments of European states as well as humanitarianism. Being a 
professor, my voice has been heard in places where without this qualification it is not 
evident that this would have been the case. Because of the honour which the university 
conferred on me, my voice has been heard in many policy venues such as the Council 
of Europe, the European Parliament, the European Commission, UNHCR, OHCHR 
and elsewhere where as a simple British solicitor the value of my research would have 
had much less impact. There are many types of courage which the academic commu-
nity expects from professors these include: speaking unwelcome truths to society and 
policy makers; dispelling myths which are capable of harming people’s lives; and per-
haps most importantly teaching students to be rigorous and critical in their research 
and their thinking.
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Professors are also given the duty and the honour of teaching new generations of young 
people and supervising their research. It is to this aspect of my work that I will now 
turn.
the students
Already in 1998 I began teaching students at the Radboud University. In the context of 
a cooperation agreement with the Ministry, I commenced teaching European Immigra-
tion Law originally aimed at civil servants in the Ministry to provide them with the le-
gal knowledge they needed to carry out their jobs correctly. The course continued after 
the end of the cooperation project and eventually became a compulsory course on the 
Human Rights LLM. Although I taught this course (with increasing numbers of col-
leagues participating in it) for almost 20 years, the content change dramatically. When 
I started, the course was exclusively about the right of free movement of workers, the 
self-employed, service providers and recipients and their family members within the 
EU. But in 1999 the Amsterdam Treaty came into force giving competence to the EU over 
migration, borders and asylum and the contents of the course had to adjust to the 
adoption of EU legislation in these fields as well. Indeed, with time these fields relating 
to third country nationals almost began to dominate the course. But the enlargements 
of the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013 and the transitional arrangements limiting the right 
of free movement of workers for nationals of the acceding states meant that the origi-
nal content of the course remained highly relevant. 
Enlargement also changed the nature of my student body as young people from across 
Central and Eastern Europe came to the Radboud University eager to understand the 
new rights which they were in the course of acquiring. It is with great fondness that I 
pass responsibility for this course now to others. I will remember my students over all 
these years, so eager to learn and so ready to understand the importance of free move-
ment of persons in the EU and the fair treatment of third country nationals. It has been 
my privilege to supervise the PHD theses of a number of outstanding scholars, so many 
of whom have gone on to stellar careers both nationally and internationally. I have 
learned so much from them and enjoyed the pleasure of the intellectual investigation 
– unearthing the material, struggling with the analysis and creating new knowledge in 
our field. 
 revisiting moving the borders of europe
In my inaugural lecture on 30 May 2001 I posited the question - where are the borders 
of Europe? My Europe for these purposes is the European Union and at the time, a 
Union of 15 Member States. I positioned my inquiry between Max Weber’s definition of 
the state - a territory with a bureaucracy which is successfully upholding a claim to a 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order and the 
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Westphalian order which champions the principle of state sovereignty as a state 
entitlement to control internal affairs (including borders) without hindrance. The 
investment of state sovereignty in border controls fits comfortably both in Weber’s 
definition of the state as the equivalent of a tin of beans for people where the internal 
order is established by the bureaucracy subject to a careful delineation of territory and 
the essential distinction of people between those who belong to the state and those 
who do not. The political heavy lifting of borders, as Torpey points out, is as the place 
where the politics of belonging is made visible. The Weberian states needs a definition 
of the people for whom the claimed monopoly over violence is exercised. The long and 
careful construction of the citizen, through the documentation his or her birth and 
belonging (parents, grandparents) to determine his or her entitlement to citizenship 
documented by a passport is performed finally (and decisively) at the border. The 
citizen is entitled to enter but the foreigner (some other country’s citizen) is not. The 
other person can go back to his or her country of belonging but does not need to be 
admitted to any other country. The Westphalian order supports the investment of state 
sovereignty in border controls on persons. It is the performance of sovereignty at the 
border which demonstrates the reality of the inter-state order and played out on the 
identities of people.  It is a very powerful story of bureaucratic entitlement which props 
up the illusion of power, control and sovereignty. In Europe today it is a shared state 
sovereignty  though no longer the sovereignty of a specific state which performs violence 
around external border controls as a political spectacle of claimed control. I will return 
to this shortly.
In 2001, I examined the claims to state control of borders from the perspective of the 
EU. I tried to unpick where the border controls of the EU are and where they are 
encountered. I started from the simple reality for most people that borders and their 
controls are places and practices of bureaucracy which are unsettled and diffuse. At the 
time, I used the example of a Moroccan national who first encounters the EU border 
within her own country at the consulate of the state to which she wishes to travel. 
Today she encounters the border at the offices of an external service provider, a private 
business with which consulates contract to assist in the processing of visa applications. 
Whether or not she will be able to make a visa application or not will depend on the 
service provider whose job it is to ensure that only ‘complete’ applications are forwarded 
to the consulate for approval. But once her complete application is sent to the consulate 
and validated (as all but 9% of applications for short stay visas are) she will be able to 
enter the EU through the border crossing point of any of the 26 Schengen participating 
states. But before she will arrive at a physical border she will encounter the border 
control carried out by the transport company – airline officials checking her passport 
and visa or agencies which carry out this control for airlines. All these actors will be 
private sector ones as well engaged in border controls because destination states 
9interrogating europe’s  borders:  reflections from an academic career
threaten them with fines for failure to do so. Next, she will encounter the border on 
entering the EU territory, but the state authority carrying out the border control may 
be entirely different from the one which issued her a visa. At least this time the control 
will be carried out by a state authority rather than the private sector. But increasingly 
the control may be carried out by a machine. However, she can relax, the chances that 
she will be refused admission at the external border of the EU are 0.0005% (according 
to the EU external border agency Frontex). Further she is unlikely to spend much time 
at the border control place as Frontex tells us that the border guard has 12 seconds to 
make a decision on her entry and will almost always make a positive decision. 
In my inaugural lecture I examined four issues: (1) the export of the border into the 
territory of other states as part of the completion of the abolition of intra-Schengen 
borders; (2) the engagement of the private sectors as the gatekeeper of enforcement of 
border controls through sanctions on carriers bringing unauthorized people to the EU 
border; (3) the consequences of these two developments for refugees and persons 
seeking international protection squeezed out of access to the authorized travel indus-
try and (4) the possible emergence of the private sector as the licensing authority for 
migration management.  
At the time, I was particularly concerned about the position of refugees and persons in 
search of international protection, how would they be able to claim their rights in in-
ternational law to protection when those rights only come into existence when the 
border has been crossed. I was also exercised by the consequences for asylum seekers 
within the Union where the Dublin system means they have only one chance to make 
an asylum application – to a state which the EU determines is responsible. But refugee 
recognition rates varied widely, nationals from the same countries (suffering civil war 
or totalitarian persecution) depending on the Member State considering the applica-
tion. This meant that asylum seekers in very similar positions and with very similar 
claims would have very different outcomes depending on where they were required to 
make their asylum applications. In one EU state they would get protection while in 
another they would be rejected. This problem has not gone away. Indeed it has only 
intensified as a result of the arrival of substantially more refugees in Europe in 2015-16 
than some state anticipated. The highly criticized aspect of the Dublin system, the 
threat of forced displacement of asylum seekers from one Member State to another 
based on the EU Member States responsibility rules, in the end turned out to be a paper 
dragon. Only 3% of asylum seekers are ever actually sent form one state to another. But 
the Dublin system encourages irresponsibility among Member States as regards the 
provision of reception conditions. Administrations are reluctant to provide reception 
conditions to asylum seekers who ‘ought’ according to the Dublin rules to be the res-
ponsibility of another Member State (this notwithstanding judgments of the CJEU to 
the contrary). 
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The engagement of the private sector in border controls has intensified with the incor-
poration of external providers into the centre of visa processing. My interest in a pos-
sible new role for the private sector as licensers for migrant workers sub-contracted by 
the state to resolve labour shortage issues with only a light hand control by the state has 
turned out to be misplaced. In the end EU states have been unwilling to lift their bu-
reaucratic hand from labour migration, instead there has been an intensification in 
some states of the requirements on employers, the fees exacted. Indeed, in some Mem-
ber States employers have been coerced into carrying out very extensive immigration 
control measures to satisfy national authorities that their employees are not ‘illegal’. So 
instead of a possible liberalization we have seen greater control and regulation in many 
Member States.  
Yet, perhaps the most spectacular of the developments over the 18 years since my inau-
gural lecture has been the export of the border abroad. In the next section I will look at 
how EU law and policy has responded to the reframing of the Weberian state for the 
purposes of border controls as a group of 26 rather heterogeneous states, not even con-
sistent with EU membership and the Westphalian order as a collective exercise of state 
sovereignty at and beyond the border eventually interfering in other countries (and 
regions) state sovereignty claims.
interrogating europe’s  borders in 2019 
An inaugural lecture about borders and their control given on 30 May 2001 could not 
have taken into account what would happen a few months later on 11 September of that 
year in the USA. The attacks in the US through the use of planes as weapons astonished 
the world. The reaction of the US administration was to declare a War on Terror (fi-
nally ended in 2013) which included: the invasion of Afghanistan (US forces are still 
present there) and Iraq, the creation of a US detention centre for suspected terrorists 
on the island of Cuba (in Guantanamo Bay – still open and holding men from 2001 
without trial), the operation of a US extraordinary rendition programme (with compli-
city from a number of EU states – now ended but in favour with the current US Presi-
dent) where people were kidnapped from one country and taken to another for inter-
rogation which included torture and enhanced border control. All of these measures 
had profound effects on border controls and their place within systems of rule of law. 
The invasion of two states constitutes a challenge to the Westphalian order of state 
sovereignty. The US extraterritorial detention centre for foreigners in Guantanamo Bay 
was chosen because it was not on US soil and the US legal order would not protect 
those detained there. The border of law and the border of involuntary movement of 
people converged. The extraordinary rendition programme also depended on subver-
ting the borders of law and the movement of persons – people were moved involunta-
rily from their home state to other states around the world where the CIA had negotia-
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ted use of bases where their operatives could torture them. According to the Council of 
Europe’s Marty report on European state complicity, it seems that when CIA chartered 
flights carrying detainees arrived at some European airports, the US staff were subject 
to border controls but the detainees were classified as ‘packages’ and no border control 
was carried out. All these actions are profoundly problematic for the Weberian state 
where people are supposed to stay where they belong, not be packaged up and shipped 
around the world for inhuman and degrading treatment and torture at the whim of a 
foreign state. The US focus on borders and how they could be used to achieve greater 
security for the USA (and its citizens) was a siren call to the world. The temptation to 
enhance border controls in light of the heightened terrorism threat as propounded by 
the USA was substantial. But in the EU it ran straight into another policy development 
– enlargement. By 2001 it was clear that at least a number of the former Soviet block 
states would be joining the EU soon. In the end the Baltic states, Slovenia and the two 
Mediterranean islands were also included in the big bang enlargement which took pla-
ce on 1 May 2004. 
It was not possible for the EU in 2001 to reframe its vision of itself as moving its borders 
outwards and embracing its neighbours into the internal market to one of hard borders 
designed to keep out threat and danger. The neighbours were about to join the EU and 
in due course Schengen and thus could not be presented as the source of threat and 
danger but rather the venue of peace and hope (including free movement of persons 
and the abolition of border controls). The President of the European Commission at 
the time, Romano Prodi announced the Neighborhood Policy – planning to extend the 
EU’s internal market (but not the institutions) far beyond the sphere of states which 
were joining the EU. This policy would work fairly well towards the East but not at all 
towards the South, across the Mediterranean.  
The unsettling of the borders of Europe which I described in 2001, continued with the 
2004 enlargement, the 2007 - enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania and in 2013 the 
addition of Croatia. While none of the post 2004 states have been admitted to the Sc-
hengen border-control free area yet, the pressure is there and rising. This flexibility of 
borders and where their controls take place confounds both a Weberian understanding 
of the state and a Westphalian order where the performance of border controls is a 
statement of state sovereignty. But the adjustment of EU states to the new regime was 
surprisingly smooth. While interior ministries fumed at the loss of a critical tool of 
crime prevent and protection of the state – border controls, the EU political consensus 
ignored them. Indeed, Eurostat began producing statistics on (police recorded) crime 
which show a continuous drop in crime from 1995 onwards irrespective of the abolition 
of border controls or how many states were included.  
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But this unsettling of where border controls take place facilitated the development of 
policies to move border controls even farther from the EU’s external border into the 
territory of other countries. The relaxation of the link between borders and their con-
trols with the existence of the state and state sovereignty in a Weberian or Westphalian 
way made their displacement ever easier. The purpose of the border controls however 
also need to be re-defined. While crime and terrorism are always favorites for advocates 
of stronger border controls, neither are particular helpful in an EU context. Eurostat 
tells us that crime is dropping irrespective of border controls and Europol (TE-SAT) tells 
us that terrorism in the EU is largely an ethno-nationalist/separatist affair with only 
tangential links to cross border movement, almost all of them intra-EU. Instead, as the 
EU exercised ever more of its 1999 competences, with the creation of an EU Border 
Agency Frontex in 2005, a Border Code in 2006, in 2008 a Return Directive, and in 
2009 a Visa Code, border control became increasing merged with migration manage-
ment. The policy documents of the EU presented a picture that better border control 
would result in more effective migration management, in particular from a coercive 
perspective: keeping out unwanted foreigners and expelling them if they did get in. One 
problem with this approach is the convergence of two very different policy areas. Border 
control and migration management are only loosely connected. Border control is about 
organizing the orderly movement of people arriving in a state through a rapid check of 
their documents. 
As Frontex has explained, a border guard has only 12 seconds to make a decision on the 
admission of a person at the external border. This is insufficient time to make any cal-
culation of the impact on migration management that the entry of one individual 
might have on the EU particularly one with no internal border controls. It is unrealistic 
and futile to expect that border control will enhance migration management – it is 
simply not possible unless a state or region is willing to block the entry of virtually all 
foreigners such as is done in North Korea. But the fantasy that border control can be 
used as a migration management tool has been very popular among some interior mi-
nistries in the EU. It also fuels a policy development that border controls better carried 
out in countries far away (on the so-called migration routes) can enhance migration 
management in the EU. The idea is that if people cannot cross borders far away from 
the EU then they are less likely to get to the EU and become a migration management 
problem. 
But the first question which must be asked is whether the EU actually has a border con-
trol and/or migration management problem. According to Frontex, out of over 300 
million entries at the external border in 2018, 3/4 were third country nationals.1 A total 
of 190,930 persons were refused entry at external borders of the EU. This constitutes 
approximately 0.0006% of total entries at external borders. Yet this very low percen-
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tage of people refused entry at the EU external border does not transform into substan-
tial pressure for irregular border crossing. Again according to Frontex, there were a total 
of 150,114 illegal border crossings into the EU of which 114,276 were by sea. The consti-
tutes approximately 0.0005% of the entries at external borders. One argument some-
times put forward is that few people are refused entry at the external border because the 
unsuitable ones are ‘weeded out’ at the visa stage. Yet, the Commission tells us that of 
the approximately 16 million Schengen visas applied for in 2018, only 9.6% were not 
issued.2 
Further, Frontex states that 361,636 persons were treated as irregularly staying in the EU 
in 2018. Of these, however it tells us that only 75,241 third country nationals were sub-
ject to forced returns (expulsion) in the same year. This constitutes approximately 
0.21% of those originally counted as irregularly present. The top five nationalities of 
persons forcible expelled from the EU were Albania, Moroccan, Algeria, Tunisian and 
Ukrainian (nationals of neighbouring states).3 Further, Eurostat tells us that in 2017 
(the most recent year for which statistics are available) 3.1 million first residence per-
mits were issued to third country nationals (the top five nationalities were Ukrainians, 
Syrians, Chinese, Indians and US nationals).4 The EU political problem with these sta-
tistics is that they do not reveal a crisis in terms of pressure on the EU external borders 
nor a migration management problem. The pressure at the external borders as regards 
irregular entry is miniscule (and dropping according to Frontex). Any policy which is 
designed to address as a ‘serious’ problem a statistical non-compliance issue of less 
than 0.0005% lacks credibility. 
Yet, the EU and its Member States have pursued extraterritorial border control operati-
ons with deadly consequences for a small number of people. According to IOM 3,139 
persons were missing in the Mediterranean in 2017, 2,299 in 2018 and so far in 2019, 
859. In general missing migrants in the Mediterranean crossing have exceeded 2,000 
since 2014. The Mediterranean has become something of a testing ground for the EU in 
these extra-territorial adventures. As Hein de Haas has explained, before the consolida-
tion of the Schengen list of countries whose nationals must obtain visas to come to the 
EU with the inclusion of most African states on the mandatory visa list in the 1990s, 
people rarely drowned trying to cross the Mediterranean. However, once the extrater-
ritorial step of consolidated mandatory visa obligations came into place anyone who 
could not get a visa but who wanted to travel had to resort to more dangerous means. 
This has given rise to much friction with the private shipping and fishing sector where 
a strong international obligation to rescue people at risk of drowning has come into 
conflict with an increasingly strong reluctance of some Mediterranean countries to 
permit disembarkation. Commercial ships do not want to rescue people if they cannot 
drop them off quickly and easily somewhere where they will be safe. From October 2013 
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to October 2014 the Italian navy took over responsibility operating a very expensive 
programme called Mare Nostrum to save the lives of migrants at sea who had endea-
voured to cross the Mediterranean under poor conditions. The cost of the trips by 
smugglers is not cheap – often recorded at around $1,000. A trip on a safe (unionised) 
ferry from Morocco to Spain costs about € 35 if booked in advance. The cost of the Mare 
Nostrum operation per month was € 9 million. 
I will come back to the end of the More Nostrum operation shortly, but before that, the 
challenge which the flight of around 2 million mainly Syrians from Turkey to Greece 
then across the Balkans to northern Europe in 2015 – 2016 must be factored in. The 
numbers arriving in Europe, while small in comparison with the Syrian refugee popu-
lations in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, caused a political crisis which resulted in a 
small number of interior ministries re-introducing intra-Schengen border controls on 
persons (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Norway) to avoid responsibility for 
asylum seekers arriving at their borders. The intra-Schengen border controls rules were 
modified a number of times, and the recalcitrant states were not disciplined by the EU 
institutions. But the robustness of the intra-Schengen system meant that the controls 
had to be limited to a small number of places. An official of a Permanent Representa-
tion in Brussels told me that on the Austrian-German autobahn, the traffic radio sta-
tion advises drivers when and where a border control is set up so that drivers can avoid 
the affected junction and the related delay. But the extraterritorialing of border con-
trols was also presented as the way to prevent asylum seekers arriving from Turkey. The 
EU Turkey Statement 18 March 2016 transferred responsibility to Turkey to prevent un-
wanted crossings in return for the promise of visa liberalisation for Turkish nationals 
coming to the EU for short stays by the end of June 2016 and 3 billion euros under the 
Facility for Refugees in Turkey. The Statement has been controversial as it does not com-
ply with EU legislative requirements and so was found by the CJEU not to be an EU 
agreement, thus not justiciable by the CJEU. While the Turkish authorities consider 
that they have fulfilled their obligations under the Statement, the EU has most visibly 
and spectacularly not as regards visa liberalization.  
At the end of the Mare Nostrum operation, two alternatives emerged. First, a number 
of non-governmental organisations such as MSF, Sea Watch and SOS Mediterranee, 
started operating boats along key stretches of the Mediterranean with the sole objective 
of saving lives at risk. In September 2015 the EU commenced Operation Sophia, a naval 
operation with the vocation to save lives, identify, capture and dispose of vessels and 
enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers and 
to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking. Operation Sophia 
was launched after the head of the EU External Action Service convinced the UN Secu-
rity Council to give approval for it. But when in 2019 the Italian authorities refused 
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disembarkation, the German authorities withdrew their ship from the Operation and 
it’s life-saving vocation has stalled. The mandate of the Operation was extended in 
2016 to include training the Libyan coast guard and navy. However, this activity has not 
been uncontroversial. 
A communication was made to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
alleging EU and Member State responsibility for death by drowning in the Mediterranean, 
lodged on 3 June 2019. The core of the communication, (244 pages long) calls for the 
prosecution of senior EU and Member State officials on the grounds that:
 “1001. The evidence provided to the Prosecutor is diverse and includes an expert 
opinion on the situation of migrants in Libya; a victim statement confirming, for 
the first time to the best of our knowledge, the involvement of the Libyan Coast 
Guard (‘LYCG’) in smuggling, trafficking and detention of migrants; internal 
documents of high-level EU organs, framing the commission of multiple Crimes 
Against Humanity within the context of a predefined plan executed pursuant to a 
policy aimed at stemming migration flows of Africans; statements by policymakers, 
made before, during and after the commission of the crimes, that establish their 
awareness of the lethal consequences of their decisions and implicate them in the 
alleged crimes; and reports by civil society organizations on the “dire and 
unacceptable” human rights situation in Libya.”
The information contained in the communication is indeed troubling. But in the 
meantime, the Italian authorities began refusing disembarkation in Italy of people 
saved by NGO boats. By December 2018, MSF stopped its humanitarian rescue 
operation when its ship, the Aquarius was the subject of sustained harassment by the 
authorities of a number of states, including the withdrawal of its licence by the French 
authorities. By June 2019, the Italian authorities were confiscating ships and arresting 
captains of any rescue ship bringing rescued persons to Italy. Currently, the best known 
of the captains is Carole Rackete who was arrested and detained (until release on a 
judge’s order recently). She still awaits trial for helping illegal immigrants enter Italy. 
Her situation is not unique. 
Also in pursuit of the extraterritorial border control policy, in 2017 the French 
government announced action to free migrants held in slave-like conditions in Libya.5 
This resulted in some UN agencies becoming engaged in evacuating migrants from 
Libya to Niger at the behest of the EU and some of its Member States.6 The outcomes 
have been fairly chequered with some resettlement to European states but some 
migrants abandoned in Niger.7 But why Niger? How did these states find one another? 
According to a researcher, the EU’s engagement with Niger began in the 1980s when it 
began funding non-government organisations engaged in local rule of law issues. 
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However, following the military Coup d’ Etat in Niger in 20108 the EU remained present 
but began funding state activities, in accordance with the new dictatorship’s demands. 
When the need arose to find a state in which to ‘park’ migrants from Libya, the EU and 
its Member States planned to engage with three states – Niger, Mauritania and Mali. 
The latter two states desisted quickly but the military leaders in Niger acquiesced to the 
requests in return for further financial contributions. Effectively, the EU and its 
Member States have been funding a dictatorship in pursuit of their border/migration 
concern.9
The Libya-Niger route is not the only EU and Member State external policy. The most 
recent object of the EU and its Member States in its border/migration policies for 
expulsion of third countries nationals of various nationalities is the Gambia where a 
failed coup attempt in 2014 has resulted in repression and economic decline.10 As the 
European Stability Initiative Newsletter 29 July 2019 states “the European Commission 
was trying to get the Gambian government to allow more than 1,000 returns of its 
citizens in a year, for many years to come. In return it offered to send a consultant to 
help the Gambian government “effectively communicate with its citizens”, as well as 
“to monitor developments in the (social) media.” These EU coercive border/migration 
related activities which target weak and totalitarian regimes with financial support in 
return for accepting expelled persons from the EU or related (ie Libya) states does not 
reflect well on the human rights commitments of the EU let alone promote responsible 
international relations.
Yet, the moving of Europe’s borders does not have to result in death, friction in 
international relations and peculiar forays into distant lands. The Mediterranean is a 
terrible example of the consequences of pursuit of policies of extra-territorialisation of 
border controls to achieve ephemeral if not illusory migration management objectives. 
Another example is also available from the EU which is much less bloody. In 2014 the 
Russian Federation annexed Crimea. Eastern Ukraine was destabilised and armed 
hostilities are still continuing. One of the consequences of this has been an out-pouring 
of Ukrainians seeking protection from hostilities and an economy in crisis. According 
to Eurostat, Poland has issued more than ½ million first work and residence permits to 
Ukrainians per year since 2014. But under 10,000 Ukrainians have applied for asylum 
in the EU in 2017 and 2018. On 11 June 2017, the EU lifted the mandatory visa 
requirement on Ukrainians (with biometric passports) so that they could arrive at the 
EU border without having to pass through the ‘border abroad’. Instead of extending the 
extraterritoriality of the EU border, in this case the EU diminished it. Ukrainians can 
now come to the EU without a visa and without entering the EU irregularly. They can 
transition easily to work and residence permits in Poland. And still, only between 
25,000 – 38,000 Ukrainians were expelled from the EU in 2017 and 2018. Clearly the 
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states surrounding the EU’s eastern border have a different appreciation of the 
relationship of border controls and migration management than their colleagues in the 
South. Neither border control nor migration management is permitted to become a 
contentious issue either among states on the Eastern side of the EU or with the 
neighbouring states. There is nothing natural about hostility towards foreigners. 
Since my inaugural lecture, three lessons need to be learned about the EU and its 
fluctuating borders. First, border control and migration management must never be 
conflated. Border control is a regulatory procedure to ensure the orderly movement of 
people across borders. It does not contribute to migration management. Migration 
management should take place within states. The attempts to export it to the territory 
of other countries creates unnecessary friction and achieves little in the way of results. 
Secondly, the extraterritorialisation of EU border controls is causing death in the 
Mediterranean. This is unacceptable, arbitrarily visited on a small number of people 
and shameful. The EU should not be seeking to pay other countries to prevent people 
from moving – effectively inciting other states to breach the international human right 
to leave a country, any country. Thirdly, the EU is fully able to adjust its border control 
and migration management systems to meet legitimate demand for mobility. The EU 
response to Ukraine is an example of a well considered and human rights oriented 
approach to borders and migration. The key is to acknowledge that migration and 
movement of people is a political question where the preferences of ultra-patriotic 
leaders should not be tolerated.
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